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Abstract
This paper shows that scal policy in the U.S. has become ine¤ective due to lack of coordi-
nation between monetary and scal policy. We present a New Keynesian model that generates
strong output e¤ects of government spending shocks only when monetary policy coordinates
well with scal policy. Employing the post-war U.S. data, we report strong stimulus e¤ects of
scal policy during the pre-Volcker era, which rapidly dissipate when we shift the sample period
to the post-Volcker era. Finding a negligible role of the real interest rate in the propagation of
government spending shocks, we propose an alternative explanation using a consumer sentiment
channel. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show that forecasters tend
to systematically over-estimate real GDP growth in response to positive innovations in govern-
ment spending when policies coordinate well with each other. On the other hand, they are likely
to formulate pessimistic forecasts when the monetary authority maintains a hawkish stance that
conicts with the scal stimulus. The scal stimulus, under such circumstances, may generate
consumer pessimism, which decreases private spending and ultimately weakens the output ef-
fects of scal policy. We also provide statistical evidence that conrms an important role of the
sentiment channel under di¤erent regimes of policy coordination.
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1 Introduction
The sluggish economic recovery from the recent Great Recession has triggered heated debates on
the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in stimulating private activity. One group of researchers reports
signicantly positive output e¤ects of scal stimulus, which can be consistent with the New Key-
nesian macroeconomic model. However, such e¤ects could be replicated only in heavily restricted
models. See, among others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Devereux et al. (1996), Fatás and
Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2011), and Galí et al. (2007).
Many others, on the other hand, are skeptical about the e¤ectiveness of scal policy. For
instance, Ramey (2011) points out that expansionary government spending shocks tend to decrease
consumption due to a negative wealth e¤ect. See, among others, Aiyagari et al. (1992), Hall
(1986), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004), Cavallo (2006),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2012), and Owyang et al. (2013).
Another interesting question is whether scal policy has nonlinear e¤ects on output depending
on the current state of the economy. For example, Fazzari et al. (2015), Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), and Bachmann and Sims (2012) claim that scal
policy tends to have a stronger output e¤ect during times of slack, whereas Kim and Jia (2017),
Owyang et al. (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) nd no such evidence. On the other hand,
Hall (2009) and Christiano et al. (2011) suggest that the government spending multiplier can be
greater when the nominal interest rate is bounded at zero. Corsetti et al. (2012) and Ilzetzki et al.
(2013) report some international evidence that the e¤ectiveness of government stimulus depends
on country characteristics such as the exchange rate regime and public indebtedness.
In their recent work, Leeper et al. (2017) proposed an interesting theoretical framework that
generates substantially weaker responses of private spending to expansionary scal policy shocks
in an active monetary/passive scal policy regime (Regime M) than in a passive monetary/active
scal policy regime (Regime F).1
Motivated by their work, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of scal policy under di¤erent monetary
and scal policy regimes. Finding no compelling empirical evidence of passive scal policy, however,
we focus on the monetary policy stance that tends to change over time given the active stance of
scal policy.2 We assume that the central bank maintains a dovish policy stance that coordinates
well with expansionary scal policy in the Regime D. In the Regime H, however, monetary policy
makers respond aggressively to inationary pressure, conicting with scal stimulus. That is, we
assume that scal and monetary policy are well coordinated only in the Regime D. Our simulation
results demonstrate that private spending positively responds to the government spending shock in
1An active monetary policy regime refers a case that the monetary authority responds to ination aggressively. A
passive scal policy regime means that dynamics of government spending has a strong feedback from rising government
debt.
2We observe the federal government decit in 75 out of 89 years from 1929 to 2017, which is about 84% odds
(FYFSGDA188S; FRED).
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the Regime D, whereas it responds negatively in the Regime H, resulting in substantially weaker
stimulating e¤ects on the total output. In what follows, our theoretical model shows that the
real interest rate plays a key role in generating qualitatively di¤erent output e¤ects across the two
regimes.
Employing the post-war U.S. macroeconomic data, we investigate the empirical validity of these
predictions of our model. We report strong evidence of the time-varying e¤ectiveness of scal policy
with a possibility of structural breaks in the propagation mechanism of the government spending
shock across time. Specically, we observed strong stimulating e¤ects of government spending on
private economic activity in earlier sample periods when the Fed stayed accommodative, while
government spending shocks tend to discourage economic activity in the private sector when the
Fed shifted to a hawkish stance, conicting with expansionary scal policy.
Although these ndings are overall consistent with the predictions of our proposed model, we
noticed a negligibly weak role of the real interest rate in propagating scal stimulus to economic
activity, which is inconsistent with our benchmark New Keynesian model. To resolve this issue,
we propose an alternative explanation for the observed time-varying output e¤ects of scal policy
shocks using a sentiment channel. We are not the rst to introduce the role of sentiment as one of
potential drivers of macroeconomic uctuations. See, among others, Hall (1993), Blanchard (1993),
Cochrane (1994), Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2007), Bachmann and Sims (2012) and Kim and Jia
(2017).
For this purpose, we investigate how market participants revise their economic prospects when
they receive new information on the stance of scal policy through the lens of the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF) data. We show that forecasters tend to over-predict GDP growth
when monetary policy coordinates well with scal policy, while systemic under-predictions are likely
to occur when the Fed adopts a hawkish stance. We view persistent over-predictions as a sign of
optimism, while under-predictions reect pessimistic economic prospects in the market.
We further investigate this conjecture by regressing ve-quarter ahead forecasts of real GDP
growth on one-quarter ahead forecasts of real government spending growth employing a xed-size
rolling window scheme. Results reveal strong positive correlations (optimism) for the pre-Volcker
era, while we observed negative correlations (pessimism) when the stance of monetary policy became
hawkish. These ndings imply that time-varying responses in consumer sentiment may explain the
time-varying e¤ectiveness of scal policy on private spending. In the Regime D, scal stimulus
generates consumer optimism, which stimulates economic activity in the private sector. In the
Regime H, however, it generates consumer pessimism, resulting in subsequent decreases in private
spending, which ultimately weaken the e¤ectiveness of scal policy. We also provide statistical
evidence in favor of such views employing structural break tests by Hansen (1997, 2001).
Leeper et al. (2017) also demonstrate that scal policy can be less e¤ective when the monetary
authority stays hawkish. However, their contributions are mostly theoretical because their major
ndings are based on counterfactual analyses using the full sample period data. On the contrary, we
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provide historical evidence of the time-varying e¤ects of scal stimulus for the post-war U.S. data.
Furthermore, we suggest a sentiment channel as an alternative to the real interest rate channel to
explain the output e¤ects of scal policy under di¤erent policy regimes.
Perotti (2005) suggests similar evidence that scal policy became less e¤ective in more recent
sample periods using macroeconomic data from 5 OECD countries including the U.S. However, he
fails to provide convincing explanations what caused such changes. Bilbiie et al. (2008) also report
time-varying e¤ects of scal stimulus, but they focus more on the role of di¤erent feedback rules of
government spending as in Leeper et al. (2017). They suggest that nancial market deregulation
made it possible for households to smooth consumption, which makes scal policy less e¤ective.3
It seems, however, that these arguments are at odds with the data. In e¤ect, saving rates have
substantially declined since the 1980s when deregulation began in the U.S.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline New
Keynesian models. Section 3 reports simulation results that highlight qualitatively di¤erent output
e¤ects of scal stimulus across the regimes. In Section 4, we present our empirical models along
with data descriptions. We demonstrate time-varying responses of our key economic variables
to government spending shocks. We provide strong evidence of a weak role of the real interest
rate in propagating scal stimulus over time. We then discuss a possibility of the existence of
a consumer sentiment channel as an alternative. Employing the SPF data, section 5 provides a
novel statistical approach that extracts useful information on how market participants revise their
economic prospects when they receive new information on government spending. We show market
agents become more optimistic in the Regime D in response to the government spending shock,
while they become pessimistic in the Regime H, which helps explain weaker output e¤ects of scal
policy during the Regime H. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Model
We present a standard New Keynesian model that features external habit formation in consumption,
variable capacity utilization, investment adjustment costs, and monopolistic competition in the
production. Sticky prices and sticky wages are modeled using the framework of Calvo (1983) and
Yun (1996). Government spending directly enters households utility as a complement to private
consumption, because this specication in a sticky-price model turns out to help reconcile theory
and empirical evidence. For more details, see among others, Linnemann and Schabert (2004) and
Leeper et al. (2017). Monetary authority follows a Taylor rule, while scal rules are specied with a
feedback to government debt as described in Leeper et al. (2017). In what follows, we demonstrate
the e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus critically hinges upon the stance of monetary policy.
3They argue that more savings instruments became available due to nancial market deregulation, which helped
households to act in line with the permanent income hypothesis.
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2.1 Firms and Price Setting
The nal good (yt) is a composite good of a continuum of intermediate goods (yit), characterized
by a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, yt =
hR 1
0 y
(p 1)=p
it di
ip=(p 1)
, where p > 1 governs
the degree of substitution between the inputs. Taken input prices (Pit) and the output price
Pt =
R 1
0 P
1 p
it di
1=1 p
as given, the prot maximization yields the demand for intermediate
good i, yit = (Pit=Pt)
 p yt. The intermediate good i is produced by a monopolistically competitive
rm who has the following production function:
yit = (k
s
it)
 n1 it ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1). nit and ksit denote the level of labor hours and capital services used by rm i,
respectively.4
Each monopolistically competitive rm solves a two-stage problem. In the rst stage, taken
input prices (wt and rkt ), as given, each rm rents labor (nit) and capital (k
s
it) to minimize its
operating cost, wtnit + rkt k
s
it, subject to its production function (1). Cost minimization yields the
identical real marginal cost:
mct = w
1 
t

rkt

; (2)
where  =

1
1 
1   
1


. In the second stage, each intermediate goods rm chooses its price
(Pit) to maximize the discounted present value of future prots subject to the demand for yit.
Following the price-setting scheme proposed by Calvo (1983), intermediate rm i can reset its
price (P it) with a xed probability (1   !p). With probability !p, it partially indexes its price to
past ination according to the following rule:
Pit = 
p
t 1
1 pPit 1; (3)
where t  PtPt 1 is the gross ination rate between t  1 and t, while  is the steady state ination.
Note that indexation is controlled by the parameter p 2 [0; 1] that allows any combinations of the
two types of indexation usually employed in the literature, steady state ination (e.g., Yun (1996))
and the past ination rate (e.g., Christiano et al. (2005)). Throughout this paper, variables with a
bar denote steady state values.
4ksit is the e¤ective amount of capital, which is introduced in the next section.
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The prot maximization problem for rm i that reoptimizes its price at time t is:
max
P it
Et
1X
s=0
(!p)
s t+s
t
" 
pt;sP

it
Pt+s
 mct+s
!
yit+s
#
(4)
s:t: yit+s =
 
pt;sP

it
Pt+s
! p
yt+s
pt;s =
(
1 for s = 0Qs
k=1 
p
t+k 1
1 p for s  1
)
;
where the prot at time t+s is discounted by the pricing kernel s (t+s=t) and t is the marginal
utility (or shadow price) of wealth of households at time t that appears in the following subsection.
The optimality condition from (4) implies:
Et
1X
s=0
(!p)
s t+s
t

t;sP

it
Pt+s
 Mpmct+s

yit+s = 0 (5)
whereMp  pp 1 . The aggregate price index evolves as follows:
1 = (1  !p) (t )1 p + !p
 

p
t 1
1 p
t
!1 p
(6)
where t =
P t
Pt
.
2.2 Households and Wage Setting
There is a continuum of households on the unit interval [0; 1] indexed by j. In addition to hours
worked (njt), each household j derives utility from composite consumption (cjt) which consists
of private goods (cjt) and public goods (gt), that is, cjt  cjt + ggt. Parameter g governs the
degree of substitutability/complementarity of the consumption goods. When g < 0, private and
public consumption are complements (Leeper et al. (2017)), whereas g > 0 implies that these are
substitutes with each other (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992); Ambler and Paquet (1996); Finn
(1998)). Household j maximizes the following lifetime utility,
Et
1X
t=0
t
"
ln
 
cjt   hct 1
   n1+jt
1 + 
#
; (7)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and h 2 (0; 1) denotes the external habit formation parameter.
To put it di¤erently, we dene the habit stock by a fraction of lagged aggregate consumption (hct 1).
 is the disutility parameter from work and 1= determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
6
The households real ow budget constraint is given by:
cjt + ijt +
Bjt
Pt
 Rt 1Bjt 1
Pt
+ (1  n)wjtnjt +
h
1  k

rkt ujt   a (ujt)
i
kjt 1 + djt + tr (8)
where the left-hand side represents the uses of income, private consumption (cjt), investment (ijt),
and purchases of nominal government debt (Bjt) deated by Pt. The right-hand side denotes the
sources of income consisting of real interest payments of government debt, after-tax real wage (wjt)
and capital rental (rkt ) income, dividends distributed by the intermediate goods rms (djt), and
constant lump-sum transfer payments (tr) from the government. n and k are constant tax rates
levied on labor income and capital, respectively.5
The e¤ective amount of capital services is represented by ksjt  ujtkjt 1, whereas a(ujt)kjt 1
describes the physical cost associated with variations in the degree of capacity utilization, which is
parameterized by a quadratic function, a (ujt) = 1 (ujt   1) + 22 (ujt   1)2. 6 Note that u = 1 and
a(1) = 0 in the steady state. We also dene a
00(1)
a0(1)  21 2 following Smets and Wouters (2007).7
The law of motion for capital is:
kjt = (1  ) kjt 1 +

1  S

ijt
ijt 1

ijt; (9)
where  is the depreciation rate and S () denotes an adjustment cost function, proposed by Chris-
tiano et al. (2005), such that S (1) = S0 (1) = 0, and   S00 (1) > 0.
There is a representative, competitive labor agency that hires a continuum of di¤erentiated
labor from each household with the following aggregator:
nt =
Z 1
0
n
w 1
w
jt dj
 w
w 1
; (10)
where 0  w <1 is the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent types of labor. This competitive
labor agency maximizes its prot subject to this production function, taking all di¤erentiated labor
wages (wjt) and the aggregate wage (wt) as given, yielding:
njt =

wjt
wt
 w
nt; (11)
where wt is the aggregate real wage that satises wt =
R 1
0 w
1 w
jt dj
 1
1 w .
Following Erceg et al. (2000), wage stickiness is introduced in a way that is analogous to price
5We assume constant tax rates to focus mainly on the transmission channel of government spending given the tax
policy.
6Note that we use the end of period stock timing convention. For example, kt 1 is the capital stock that was
determined by investment at time t  1, but is used at time t in the production function for yt.
7We need this condition to linearize the model presented here.
7
stickiness described above. In each period, a fraction 1  !w of households can adjust their wages
to wjt and others can only index their wages by past ination as wjt = 
w
t 1
1 wwjt 1, where
indexation is controlled by the parameter w 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, the wage-setting problem of
households who reset their wages at time t can be written as:
max
wjt
Et
1X
s=0
(!w)
s U (cjt+s; njt+s) (12)
s:t: njt+s =

wt;sw

jt
wt+s
 w
nt+s
wt;s =
(
1 for s = 0Qs
k=1 
w
t+k 1
1 w for s  1
)
The rst order condition associated with this wage-setting problem can be written as:
1X
s=0
(!w)
sEt

njt+s
~ct+s

wt;sw

jt
Pt+s
 MwMRSjt+s

= 0 (13)
where Mw  ww 1 , ~ct+s  ct+s   hct+s 1, and MRSjt+s  %~ct+sn

jt+s is the relevant marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor hours in period t+ s. Therefore, the aggregate
wage index is described as follows:
1 = (1  !w)
 
w;t
1 w + !w wt 11 w
t
wt 1
wt
!1 w
(14)
where w;t =
wt
wt
.
2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Authorities
The monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. It adjusts the gross nominal interest rate (Rt) in response
to deviations of ination (t) and output (yt) from their respective steady state levels:
Rt = R
 r
t 1
"
R
t

 yt
y
y#1  r
(15)
where 0   r < 1 is the interest rate smoothing parameter, R is the equilibrium real interest rate,
 and y are the policy response parameters to the ination gap and the output gap, respectively.
The government collects tax revenues from capital and labor in addition to its sales of one-
period debt to nance its expenditures that include interest payments, government expenditures
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(gt) and transfer payments (tr). The governments ow budget constraint is:
Bt
Pt
+ nwtnt + 
krkt utkt 1 =
Rt 1Bt 1
Pt
+ gt + tr (16)
Government expenditures (gt) obey the following stochastic process:
gt = g
 g
t 1
h
g
 
bt 1=b
 gi1  g g;t (17)
where the parameter  g 2 ( 1; 1) governs the degree of the persistence of gt. Following Leeper
et al. (2017), we allow government spending to respond to deviations of the (lagged) real debt
bt 1 =
Bt 1
Pt 1 from its stead state value
b. That is, the parameter g > 0 triggers a correction of
government spending when real debt deviates from its steady state value. g;t is a government
spending shock, which is assumed to follow a stationary (g < 1) AR(1) process:
ln g;t = g ln g;t 1 + g"g;t; "g;t  N (0; 1) (18)
2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation
We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all intermediate good rms make identical choices
so that the subscript i can be omitted. All goods and asset markets clear in the equilibrium.
Specically, the goods market clear condition requires the following aggregate resource constraint:
yt = ct + it + gt + a (ut) kt 1; (19)
where capital evolves according to the law of motion for capital (9). Equilibrium conditions and
their log-linearized equivalents around the deterministic steady state are given in the Appendix.
The log-linearized model is solved using the Sims (2002) gensys algorithm.
3 Model Simulations
3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Regime specic monetary policy parameters are
based on the estimates reported by Clarida et al. (2000) to investigate the e¤ects of structural breaks
in the Feds behavioral equation. Other model parameters are along the lines of research works in
the literature or were calibrated using U.S. data over the period 1960Q1   2017Q3. Benchmark
calibration parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
The discount factor () is set to 0:9958, which equals (1=T )
PT
t=1 t=(1+(FFRt=100))
1=4 where
T is the sample size from the data, t denotes the quarterly gross ination rate, and FFRt is the
e¤ective federal funds rate. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity (1=) is xed at 2, which
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is a common value in the current literature. We set  = 0:025 for the quarterly depreciation rate
for capital that implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The disutility parameter () is an
implied parameter that is calibrated with other parameters so that hours worked in the steady
state is close to 1=3 in a model with divisible labor.8 The habit formation coe¢ cient (h) and the
complementarity parameter (g) of consumption between private goods and public goods are set
to 0:99 and  0:2, respectively, which are similar to the ones in Leeper et al. (2017).
The Cobb-Douglas factor share of capital () is set to 0:33. The price elasticity of demand for
individual good (p) and the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent types of labor (w) are all
calibrated to be 8. The capital utilization rate (2) and the adjustment cost for investment ()
are set to 0:15 and 5, respectively, being consistent with the estimation results in Leeper et al.
(2017). The parameters for price stickiness (!p) and wage stickiness (!w) are both assumed to be
0:8, implying a slightly over one-year average duration of price/labor contracts.
Monetary and scal parameters are calibrated based on the mean values from U.S. data over
the same sample period in the present paper. The steady state gross quarterly ination rate
() is assumed to be 1:0082. The total government spending-to-GDP ratio (sg) is set to 0:0945.
The government debt-to-GDP ratio (sb) is 1:3707. The persistence parameter (g) of government
spending is assumed to be 0:98. The average labor tax rate (n) is set to 0:2171 and the capital
tax rate (k) is 0:2497.
To highlight the implications of policy coordination of monetary and scal policies, we dene
the following two regimes. In the regime D, policy makers stay accommodative in the stance of both
monetary and scal policy. The dovish central bank puts greater emphasis on output stabilization,
thus responds only weakly to ination to keep the balance between output and ination stability.
Reecting this view, the (long run) coe¢ cients on ination () and on the output (y) are set
to 0:83 and 0:27, respectively, while the interest rate smoothing parameter ( r) is assumed to be
0:68. These values are based on the work of Clarida et al. (2000) for the pre-Volcker era that ends
right before Paul Volcker took o¢ ce as the new Federal Reserve chairman in 1979Q3. Government
spending is assumed not to respond to the government debt, that is, g is set to 0 implying that
the scal authority also implements their stimulus policies aggressively.
In the regime H, however, the hawkish central bank prioritizes keeping inationary pressure in
check, which results in more aggressive responses to the ination gap, conicting with the scal
stimulus of the government. For this specication, we employ the parameter values from Clarida
et al. (2000) for the post-Volcker era. That is, we set , y, and  r to 2:15, 0:93, and 0:79,
respectively. The scal authority in the regime H maintains a less dovish stance than its stance in
the Regime D, implementing mildly expansionary scal policy with g = 0:07. We assume g = 0:8
and g = 0:01 for the stochastic process of the government spending shock in (18) in both regimes.
8This roughly matches the observation that individuals spend 1=3 of their time engaged in market activities and
2=3 of their time in non-market activities. See Hansen (1985).
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Table 1 around here
3.2 Simulation Results
This subsection reports simulated impulse-response functions (IRFs) of key macroeconomic vari-
ables to positive government spending shocks under the two regimes, the Regime D (solid) and the
Regime H (dashed), in Figure 1.
We observe persistently positive output e¤ects of scal policy only in the Regime D, where
the monetary authority maintains a dovish monetary policy stance in collaboration with the scal
stimulus. Output and ination both rise in response to the government spending shock, but the
central bank raises the interest rate at a slower rate than ination, resulting in a decrease in the real
interest rate for about two years. Responses of the private GDP also stay positive in the rst two
years until persistently positive consumption responses are dominated by the negative response of
investment. The total GDP exhibits persistent, solid positive responses even when the private GDP
responds negatively after the rst two years, which implies that responses of public (government)
spending dominate those of the private GDP.
On the other hand, we obtained substantially weaker output e¤ects of scal policy in the
Regime H, which sharply contrast with those in the Regime D. In response to the government
spending shock, ination rises slower than the nominal interest rate as the central bank raises the
interest rate aggressively to curb ination, maintaining a hawkish policy stance. Consequently,
the real interest rate rises, crowding out investment, which results in immediate decreases in the
private GDP. Private consumption responds positively, reecting the complementarity between
government spending and consumption. However, its positive responses are dominated by decreases
in investment, which result in negative responses of the private GDP. The total GDP rises in
the short-run driven by increases in government spending, but eventually falls below zero due to
substantial negative responses of the private GDP.
Overall, our simulation results clearly demonstrate that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy greatly
hinges upon the coordination of monetary and scal policies. In the next section, we report strong
empirical evidence of time-varying output e¤ects of scal policy in the private sector using the
post-war U.S. macroeconomic data. We found a very limited role of the real interest rate in the
propagation mechanism of scal policy, which is at odds with the simulation results from our
baseline New Keynesian model presented in this section. In what follows, we suggest a consumer
sentiment channel as an alternative to the real interest rate channel.
Figure 1 around here
11
4 The Empirics
This section presents our baseline empirical model for the U.S. post-war macroeconomic data. We
report solid empirical evidence that supports time-varying output e¤ects of scal policy.
4.1 The Empirical Model
We employ the following vector autoregressive (VAR) process of order p.
xt = 
0dt +
pX
j=1
Ajxt j +C"t; (20)
where
xt = [gt yt zt]
0;
dt is a vector of deterministic terms that includes an intercept and up to quadratic time trend. C
denotes a lower-triangular matrix and "t is a vector of mutually orthonormal structural shocks, that
is, E"t"
0
t = I. We are particularly interested in the j-period ahead orthogonalized impulse-response
function (IRF) dened as follows.
IRFk;j = E (xt+j j"k;t = 1;
t 1)  E (xt+j j
t 1) ; (21)
where "k;t is the structural shock to the kth variable in (20) that occurs at time t. 
t 1 is the
adaptive information set at time t  1, that is, 
j  
j 1;8j.
gt denotes federal government spending, which is used to identify the scal policy shock. We em-
ploy discretionary components of government spending, that is, federal consumption expenditures
and gross investment. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), gt is ordered rst in xt, meaning
that gt is not contemporaneously a¤ected by innovations in other variables within one quarter.
This assumption is frequently employed in the current literature, because implementations of dis-
cretionary scal policy actions require Congressional approvals, which normally take more than one
quarter.9
yt is the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), but we also consider the private real
GDP per capita (pgdpt) for yt to measure the stimulus e¤ects of scal policy on private activity. In
addition, we directly employ private spending variables for yt such as private consumption (conmt)
and private investment (invtt).
xt includes a vector of control variables from the money market zt = [intt mont]
0, where intt
is the e¤ective federal funds rate and mont is the log monetary base. These variables are ordered
9Kim and Jia (2017) employed the government total expenditures that includes transfer payments in addition
to the discretionary government consumption and investment spending. Since transfer payments have automatic
stabilizers, they put gt next to yt.
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in the last block, because the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) can revise the stance
of monetary policy whenever policy-makers deem it necessary by holding regular and emergency
meetings. Note that intt is ordered before mont, because the Fed targets the interest rate, while
the monetary base changes endogenously.
It is well known that econometric inferences from recursively identied VAR models may not
be robust to alternative VAR ordering. It turns out that our empirical ndings are not subject
to such criticism as long as we are interested in the IRFs to the government spending (gt) shock,
IRF1;j . Given the location of gt, IRF1;j is numerically identical even if all variables next to gt are
randomly re-shu­ ed. See Christiano et al. (1999) for details.10
4.2 Data Descriptions
We obtained most data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. Observations
are quarterly frequency and span from 1960Q1 to 2017Q3.
gt is federal consumption expenditures and gross investment (FGCE), which constitutes dis-
cretionary components of federal government expenditures. The private GDP (pgdpt) is the total
GDP (gdpt; NGDP) minus total (federal and state & local) government consumption expenditures
and gross investment (GCE). Consumption (conmt) is total personal consumption expenditures
on nondurables (PCND) and services (PCESV). Investment (invtt) denotes private nonresidential
xed investment (PNFI). All spending variables are expressed in real per capita terms. That is,
they are divided by the GDP deator (GDPDEF) and by the civilian noninstitutional population
(CNP16OV), then log-transformed.
The nominal interest rate (intt) is the e¤ective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) divided by
100, which can be used to identify the monetary policy shock.11 mont is the monetary base
(BOGMBASE), expressed in natural logarithm. We also employ the ex post real interest rate in
our VAR models, which equals intt minus the consumer price index (CPIAUCSL) based ination.
Later, we augment our benchmark VAR model (20) with the (log) Index of Consumer Expecta-
tions (sentt) to investigate the propagation mechanism of scal policy through consumer sentiment.
We obtained sentt from the University of Michigans Survey of Consumers database. sentt provides
information on the level of consumer condence about economic conditions in the near future. In
addition to this forward-looking sentiment index, we experimented with the Current Conditions
Index and the Index of Consumer Sentiment (combined index), obtained from the same source.
All three indices are highly correlated with each other, thus yield qualitatively similar empirical
results.12
10Similarly, all response functions to monetary policy shocks are robust to alternative ordering given the location
of monetary variables, intt and mont.
11We observed no evidence of structural breaks in the output e¤ects of monetary policy. Results are available upon
requests.
12All results are available from authors upon request.
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Also, we use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data to understand how market
participants revise their forecasts of key macroeconomic variables. The median SPF forecasts data
for relevant variables were obtained from the Philadelphia Fed website for the period between
1968Q4 and 2017Q3. 13 There were 9 changes in the base year in the National Income and
Product Account (NIPA) during this sample period. Some authors (Ramey (2011); Forni and
Gambetti (2016)) used growth rates of the SPF forecasts without adjusting for changes in the base
year, which generates 9 outlier observations in the data. To prevent this, we re-scaled all relevant
forecast data so that they are expressed in 2009 dollar terms.
It should be noted that forecasters were asked to predict nominal defense spending until
1981Q2.14 Since then, they were asked to predict real federal consumption expenditures and
gross investment. Following Ramey (2011), we used the GDP deator median forecasts to convert
nominal defense spending forecasts to real defense spending forecasts. We combine the real defense
spending forecasts with the real federal spending growth forecasts in order to acquire the data for
reasonably long sample period. This seems to be a fairly good approximation for the growth rate
forecasts, because they tend to exhibit high degree comovements.15 Ramey (2011) also employed
a similar approach. In what follows, we study how market agents reformulate their forecasts for
the output growth, ySPFt+j   ySPFt 1 when they revise the forecasts of government spending growth,
gSPFt+j   gSPFt 1 .16
4.3 Empirical Findings
4.3.1 The Weakening E¤ectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus
This section reports an array of the impulse-response function (IRF1;j) estimates to a positive 1%
structural shock to government spending (gt) as described in (20) and (21). We also report 90%
condence intervals obtained from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations using the empirical
distribution.17 Our ndings below demonstrate that the output e¤ects of scal stimulus have
become substantially weaker over time.
Figures 2 and 3 present the responses of the GDP (gdpt) and the private GDP (pgdpt), re-
spectively, to the expansionary government spending shock from a quad-variate VAR with xt =
[gt gdpt(pgdpt) intt mont]
0. Specically, gures in the panel (a) are based on the rst 30-year
sample period (SP1), 1960Q1 to 1989Q4, while the last 30-year sample period (SP2), 1987Q4 to
13The mean SPF forecasts yielded qualitatively similar results.
14We thank Tom Stark at the Philadelphia Fed who kindly provided us nominal defense spending data from 1968Q4
to 1981Q2, which are not available on the SPF website.
15Results are available upon requests from authors.
16We assume these forecasts are formulated utilizing the information set at time t 1, since the current period data
such as yt and gt are not known at time t. Note that forecasters are asked to predict, or nowcast, yt and gt. Note
also that forecasters are asked to predict the values at time t  1 (previous period) because these values are subject
to revisions, although their predictions normally stay the same from the previous period.
17The 5th and 95th percentiles of the 500 response function estimates constitute the 90% condence interval.
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2017Q3, was used to generate the IRFs in the panel (b).
It should be noted that the output responses from these sub-sample periods are qualitatively
di¤erent. The IRF point estimates of the total GDP and the private GDP to the government
spending shock are well above zero in SP1 (1960Q1 1989Q4), whereas their responses have become
substantially muted when we employ data in SP2 (1987Q4  2017Q3). Putting it di¤erently, both
output responses remain positive for a prolonged period of time in SP1, but their responses become
overall negative in SP2. We also note that the private GDP never respond positively to the shock in
SP2, implying that initial positive responses of the total GDP simply reect increases in government
spending.
These IRFs imply the possibility of the time-varying e¤ectiveness of scal policy in stimulating
private activity (pgdpt). In other words, the government spending shock seems to have promoted
private spending in SP1 but not in SP2.
Motivated by these ndings, we further investigate such possibility via repeated VAR model
estimations with a xed-size rolling window scheme described as follows. We use the rolling-window
scheme instead of recursive schemes because we are interested in detecting structural changes in
the data generating process of xt.
We begin with an estimation of the VAR model using the rst T0(< T ) observations, fxtgT0t=1.
After obtaining the rst round set of IRF estimates, we move the sample period window forward
by one. That is, new observations at time T0 + 1 (xT0+1) are added to the sample, but we drop the
oldest ones at time t = 1 (x1) to maintain the same size of the sample window. Using fxtgT0+1t=2 ,
we estimate the second round set of IRFs. We repeat until we obtain the last round IRFs using
fxtgTt=T T0+1, totalling T   T0 + 1 sets of the IRF estimates.
We report our estimates with a 30-year (T0 = 120 quarters) xed-size rolling window in the
lower panel of Figures 2 and 3 for the GDP variables.18 The range of the x-axis (Date) is from
1989Q4 to 2017Q3, where the ne grid points indicate the ending period of each rolling window.
The y-axis (Year) is the time horizon (j) of the response function indexed from 0 to 5 years. The
z-axis is the response (IRF1;j) of each variable to a 1% government spending shock.
The surface graphs in the panel (c) of Figures 2 and 3 reveal dramatic decreases in the responses
of gdpt and pgdpt over time, respectively. Strong positive responses of the GDP variables are rapidly
dragged down as more observations are added from later sample periods.
It should be noted that the responses of the private GDP become substantially negative, pushing
the total GDP responses toward a negative region, which implies that the weakening stimulus e¤ects
of scal policy are mainly driven by time-varying responses of private spending.
To highlight these transitions over time, in panel (d) of Figures 2 and 3, we report the responses
of the output variables in the short-run to the long-run by dissecting the surface graphs at y =
0; 2; 5 (years) of the y-axis from the right to the left. Contemporaneous responses (impact; y = 0)
18We also implemented the same analysis with a 20-year window as well as a 40-year window scheme. Results are
overall similar and are available upon requests.
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of gdpt and pgdpt do not exhibit substantial variations over time, while the responses in 2 years and
in 5 years clearly show a downward trend, implying the substantially diminished e¤ects of scal
stimulus over time. It is also interesting to see that positive responses of gdpt on impact (y = 0)
are due to increases in gt itself because pgdpt barely responds when the shock occurs.
Figures 2 and 3 around here
Observing these remarkably dramatic changes in private GDP responses over time, we further
look into the source of these transitions by investigating the IRFs of the two private spending vari-
ables, consumption (conmt) and investment (invtt). The IRF estimates with xt = [gt conmt(invtt) intt mont]0
are reported in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
We note a close resemblance between consumption (conmt) responses and those of the private
GDP (pgdpt) as can be seen in Figure 4. Consumption increases greatly and signicantly over time
when gt shock occurs in SP1. In SP2, however, consumption responses continue to fall to a negative
region, although we still observe a weak but positive responses in the very short-run. The surface
graph in the panel (c) conrms rapid deteriorations of the consumption responses over time. The
panel (d) graph also shows a clear downward trend of the responses of consumption to the spending
shock in the medium-run and in the long-run.
On the other hand, investment (invtt) responds overall negatively to the government spending
shock as can be seen in Figure 5, although negative responses of invtt tend to go deeper as the
sample period moves forward.19 These ndings are conrmed by the downward trend in the IRFs
in the medium-run as well as in the long-run, whereas initial responses are overall negligible as can
be seen in Figure 5(d).
These IRF analyses provide strong evidence that scal stimulus has become less e¤ective in
stimulating private spending. The positive responses of the private GDP in earlier sample periods
are mostly driven by rising consumption given overall negative responses of investment to the
shock. On the contrary, scal policy has become dramatically ine¤ective over time. The private
GDP (pgdpt) responds mostly negatively to the government spending shock when more recent
sample periods are employed, generating completely ine¤ective stimulus e¤ects of scal policy.
Figures 4 and 5 around here
19We obtain negligible responses of invtt from the rst 30-year sample period, 1960Q1~1989Q4. These seem to be
outliers because we obtained qualitatively similar negative responses by shifting the window by just a few years such
as 1962Q1~1991Q4.
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4.3.2 Assessing the Role of the Interest Rate under Di¤erent Regimes
This subsection empirically assesses the role of the interest rate channel of expansionary scal
policy shocks under di¤erent policy regimes described earlier in our theoretical models. Section
2 demonstrates that government spending shocks generate persistent stimulus e¤ects on private
spending only in the Regime D when the monetary policy stance stays accommodative. The
nominal interest rate rises slower than the ination rate, resulting in decreases in the real interest
rate, which stimulate private investment as well as consumption.
On the other hand, the nominal interest rate rises faster than the ination rate in the Regime H
as the central bank maintains its hawkish policy stance to suppress inationary pressure. The real
interest rate rises, which decreases private investment substantially, dominating positive responses
of consumption in the short-run. Therefore, scal policy fails to stimulate private activity in the
Regime H.
The U.S. post-war data seems to be overall consistent with the theoretical predictions on the
output e¤ects of scal policy. However, the data shows a very limited role of the interest rate in the
transmission mechanism of scal policy. For this purpose, we consider the VAR model (20) with
zt = [rffrt mont]
0, where rffrt is the ex-post real federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) accompanied
by the log-transformed monetary base. We used the CPI-based ination rate to obtain the ex-post
ination.
Clarida et al. (2000) demonstrated that the Fed had remained dovish (accommodative) during
the pre-Volcker era (1960Q1 1979Q2), while it had switched to a hawkish monetary policy stance
after Paul Volckers tenure began in the third quarter of 1979. With the Taylor rule parameter
estimates from their work, the New Keynesian model predicts the real interest rate to rise in
response to the government spending shock in the Regime H (post-Volcker era), while it is expected
to decline in the Regime D (pre-Volcker era).
We report empirical evidence that is at odds with these predictions. As can be seen in Figure 6,
rffrt positively responds to the scal shock in SP1 (1960Q1 1989Q4), while it responds negatively
in SP2 (1987Q4   2017Q3). Also, the IRFs of rfftt from the rolling window scheme in the panel
(c) and (d) clearly demonstrate a downward trend in all horizons.
Recall private investment tends to decline in response to the government spending shock in
both regimes. Note that both rffrt and invtt decline in response to the scal shock in SP2. This
implies that private investment must have shifted to the left by exogenous factors rather than
endogenously responding to changes in the real interest rate. We introduce a consumer sentiment
channel to explain this possibility of exogenous factors in the next section.
Figure 6 around here
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4.3.3 Fiscal Policy E¤ects on Sentiment
The role of sentiment as one of potential drivers of macroeconomic uctuations has long been
discussed in the current literature. Hall (1993) and Blanchard (1993), among others, emphasize the
causal e¤ects of animal spirit on economic activity, whereas Cochrane (1994) claims that consumer
condence reects news about changes in economic productivity in the future, which creates a close
link between innovations in consumer condence and subsequent variations in economic activity.
Using a nonlinear state-dependent VAR model, Bachmann and Sims (2012) suggest that the
government spending shock can trigger consumer optimism during times of slack, which results in
a high scal multiplier during recessions. On the other hand, Kim and Jia (2017) demonstrate that
the shock is likely to generate consumer pessimism in all phases of business cycle when properly
detrended data are used.
Recognizing a potentially important role of sentiment, we shift our attention from state-dependent
nonlinearity to a time-dependent stochastic process because sentiment responses seem to change
over time. For this purpose, we estimate and report the time-varying dynamic adjustments of
consumer sentiment in response to the government spending shock, utilizing the VAR model (20)
with zt = [intt mont sentt]
0. Recall that the location of sentt in the VAR does not matter for the
scal policy e¤ects as long as sentt is placed next to gt. See Christiano et al. (1999) for detailed
explanations on this property.
Figure 7 clearly shows qualitatively di¤erent responses of consumer sentiment over time. Con-
sumer sentiment (sentt) responds positively to the government spending shock in SP1 (1960Q1 
1989Q4), while the shock generates consumer pessimism in SP2 (1987Q4 2017Q3). The gures in
the lower panel exhibit a downward trend especially in the two-year and in the ve-year sentiment
responses, while a long swing is observed in the contemporaneous responses on impact.
We consider these changes in the response function of sentt as a clue to understand why the
output e¤ects of scal stimulus have become weaker over time. Signicant stimulating e¤ects of
scal policy during earlier sample periods are consistent with consumer optimism that results from
the government spending shock. On the other hand, it tends to generate consumer pessimism with
later observations, decreasing not only investment but also consumption.20
One possible criticism against this view is the following. Consumer sentiment may simply reect
changes in consumption rather than leading it. This doesnt seem to be the case especially in SP2.
As can be seen in Figure 4(b), consumption initially responds positively for a while when the
government spending shock occurs, whereas consumer sentiment starts deteriorating immediately
in Figure 7(b). That is, pessimism goes deeper since the impact of the shock. If sentt simply reects
the changes in conmt, sentiment must have risen at least in the short-run because consumption
rises in the short-run. Therefore, sentiment seems to be leading the innovations in consumption.
20 It might be the case that large sudden increases in government spending are perceived as a conrmation of
an incoming recession in near future, generating consumer pessimism, which then results in a decrease in private
spending.
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That is, negative responses of consumer sentiment are likely to explain substantially weaker output
e¤ects of scal stimulus in the later sample periods. Based on these observations, we claim that the
consumer sentiment channel might provide useful insights on the time-varying e¤ectiveness of scal
policy in stimulating private activity. In what follows, we investigate this possibility employing the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data.
Figure 7 around here
5 What Explains the Changes in Consumer Sentiment?
In this section, we provide statistical inferences about how market participants revise their economic
prospects when they receive new information on scal actions. For this purpose, we investigate the
time-varying relationship between GDP growth forecasts and government spending growth forecasts
that are formulated by experts in the private sector, which helps explain the time-varying output
e¤ects of scal policy via the consumer sentiment channel.
5.1 Understanding Dynamics of Sentiment through the Lens of the SPF
We rst study how private agents revise their forecasts of real GDP growth when they update
information on real government spending growth. For this purpose, we employ the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF) data for the period between 1968Q4 and 2017Q3. We are particularly
interested in the relationship between the SPF forecasts of real GDP growth and those of real
federal government spending growth.21
Let SPFxt (j + 1) = x
SPF
t+j   xSPFt 1 be the SPF growth rate forecast of (logged) xt over j + 1
quarters, while xt(j+ 1) = xt+j  xt 1 denotes the realized counterpart of SPFxt (j+ 1). We dene
the SPF forecast errors by ^xt(j + 1) = 
SPF
xt (j + 1)   xt(j + 1). Note that we do not square
forecast errors because the sign of the errors delivers important information. We rst present the
SPF forecast errors of real GDP growth over 5 quarters, ^yt(5), in Figure 8.
22 Some interesting
observations are as follows.
Note that private forecasters tend to over-estimate the real GDP growth rate (^yt(5) > 0) during
the pre-Volcker era (1968Q4   1979Q2), while they predominantly under-estimate it (^yt(5) < 0)
during the post-Volcker era until the early 2000s. During the 2000s period, the SPF forecasts stay
overall optimistic (^yt(5) > 0) till the beginning of the Great Recession, followed by much weaker
optimistic forecasts.
21See the data description section for a detailed explanation on how these data are constructed.
22The vertical line is the break date, which is estimated by the structural break test presented in the next section.
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We conjecture that these systemic forecast errors are closely related with the structural break
in the monetary policy stance suggested by Clarida et al. (2000), who pointed out that the federal
reserves interest rate setting behavior has changed when Paul Volcker took o¢ ce in the third
quarter of 1979. To put it di¤erently, they suggested that the monetary policy stance had stayed
overall accommodative during the pre-Volcker era, while the stance of monetary policy had turned
hawkish during the post-Volcker era.
This implies that private forecasters formulated more optimistic GDP growth forecasts when
monetary policy coordinated well with scal policy during the pre-Volcker era. On the other hand,
it seems that they have formulated more pessimistic GDP growth forecasts during the post-Volcker
era when monetary policy stayed hawkish until the beginning of the 2000s. In the early 2000s,
Greenspan has initiated an array of aggressive rate cuts to ght the recession triggered by the burst
of the so-called dot com bubble in 2001. Such optimism in the early 2000s has become subdued
rapidly when the Great Recession began in 2007  2008.
Figure 8 around here
We investigate this possibility by examining the time-varying relationship between SPFgt (1) and
SPFyt (5) by the following least squares (LS) regression over time using a xed-size rolling window
scheme.
SPFyt (5) = + 
SPF
gt (1) + "t (22)
The motivation of this regression analysis is the following. When market participants receive new
information on government spending growth, SPFgt (1), the realized (actual) patterns of revisions
of their real GDP growth forecasts in the future, SPFyt (5), would reveal their view about the
e¤ectiveness of the government spending shock. That is,  is likely to be greater when forecasters are
optimistic on the e¤ect of scal stimulus. As forecasters become less optimistic or even pessimistic,
 will decrease to zero or even become negative.
Figure 9 presents the LS estimates ^LS for  in (22) over time with a 44-quarter xed size rolling
window so that the initial point estimate corresponds to  from the pre-Volcker era. We also report
the 90% condence bands that are obtained from the normal approximation. This initial ^LS is
0:843, which is signicant at the 5% level. However, the ^LS estimate rapidly declines as the sample
window starts including observations from the post-Volcker era. Note that condence bands expand
greatly since then, reecting dramatic changes in ^LS after Mr. Volcker started extremely hawkish
anti-ination policies. This implies that market participants may formulate expectations of a lot
weaker and statistically insignicant output e¤ects of scal policy when the stance of monetary
policy becomes hawkish.
The ^LS becomes stabilized eventually until it begins rising from the early 2000s, reecting
accommodative monetary policy actions implemented by Mr. Greenspan to ght the recession
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that began in 2001 followed by the burst of the so-called dot com (IT) bubble. Note that the
^LS point estimates remain overall high even during the Great Recession as the monetary policy
becomes extremely accommodative with three rounds of quantitative easing (QE). However, the
condence bands become wider possibly reecting high degree uncertainty and the fact that the
role of monetary policy has become limited during the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) era. The ^LS
starts falling around the mid 2010s when the Fed began the normalization plan of monetary policy.
Putting all together, Figures 8 and 9 provide strong evidence of time-varying sentiment responses
to the government spending shock through the lens of the SPF.
Figure 9 around here
5.2 Statistical Evidence of Structural Breaks
This subsection presents statistical evidence in favor of our conjectures presented in the previous
section, which imply the presence of structural breaks in . For this, we implement structural break
tests for (22), employing the test procedure proposed by Hansen (1997, 2001).
Consider the following alternative hypothesis, HA : 1 6= 2, where  = 1; t 2 [1;  ] and
 = 2; t 2 (; T ], which implies a break at time t =  . We obtain the following three statistics
proposed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) using the full sample (T ).23
SupFT = sup
k1kk2
FT (k) (23)
ExpFT = ln
0@ 1
k2   k1 + 1
k2X
t=k1
exp

1
2
FT (k)
1A
AveFT =
1
k2   k1 + 1
k2X
t=k1
FT (k);
where FT (k) denotes the Lagrange Multiplier statistics for the null hypothesis of no structural
break, H0 : 1 = 2, given a ne candidate grid point k 2 [k1; k2].24 We used conventional
trimming parameter values, k1 = 0:15T and k2 = 0:85T . p values are obtained using the method
by Hansen (1997).
As can be seen in Table 2, the three tests in (23) strongly support the presence of a structural
break from the full sample, rejecting the null hypothesis of no structural break with virtually zero
p values. The SupFT test selects 1978Q2 as the identied break date from the full sample, which
roughly corresponds to the beginning of the post-Volcker era.
23The Chow test is not a feasible option because the structural break date is unknown.
24Alternatively, one can use the Wald or Likelihood Ratio test statistics.
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Following the sequential test approach by Hansen (2001), we seek additional break dates in the
two subsample periods that are identied by the rst structural break date, 1969Q4  1978Q2 and
1978Q2   2017Q3. We obtained no further evidence of a structural break in both the sub-sample
periods even at the 10% signicance level, concluding there was a single break in 1978Q2.25
Table 2 around here
These test results highlight the implications of the systemic patterns of the forecast errors in
Figure 8. During the pre-Volcker era that corresponds to the Regime D in our baseline theoretical
model, market participants tend to over-estimate real GDP growth, whereas they formulate their
forecasts more pessimistically during the post-Volcker era. These results are also conrmed by the
expected output e¤ects () of the government spending shock shown in Figure 9.
Putting all together, empirical ndings presented in this section imply that the e¤ectiveness
of scal stimulus greatly hinges upon the coordination of monetary and scal policies through an
important role of the consumer sentiment channel. Hawkish monetary policy that conicts with
scal stimulus generates consumer pessimism, which ultimately weakens output e¤ects by reducing
private spending.
6 Concluding Remarks
The slow recovery from the recent Great Recession has revived the debate on the e¤ectiveness of
scal stimulus among the economics profession. Can increases in government spending help stim-
ulate private activity? What variables play a dominant role in propagating government spending
shocks to private spending? Empirical evidence is at best mixed, and the economics profession has
failed to reach a consensus.
Motivated by the work of Leeper et al. (2017), we present New Keynesian macroeconomic
models that yield strong output e¤ects of scal stimulus only when monetary policy coordinates
well with scal policy. When the central bank responds to ination aggressively, private spending
tends to fall in response to government spending shocks because the central bank raises the interest
rate faster than ination, resulting in an increase in the real interest rate.
Employing the post-war U.S. macroeconomic data, we conrm these predictions about the out-
put e¤ects of scal policy. During the pre-Volcker era, the private GDP rises as consumption
increases rapidly in response to scal spending shocks. Such strong stimulus e¤ects rapidly disap-
pear when the sample period moves to the post-Volcker era. Although the empirical ndings are
overall consistent with theoretical predictions as to the output e¤ects of scal policy, we observe a
25Test results for the earlier period are available upon request.
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negligible role of the real interest rate in the propagation mechanism of scal stimulus to private
spending, which is at odds with New Keynesian models.
The present paper proposes a consumer sentiment channel as an alternative propagation mecha-
nism. We demonstrate consumer sentiment leads innovations in consumption rather than passively
reecting changes in consumption. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show
forecasters tend to make systemic forecast errors. More specically, they were likely to over-estimate
(optimism) real GDP growth when monetary and scal policies coordinate well with each other.
When policies conict with each other, however, they often formulated more pessimistic forecast.
That is, they were prone to underestimate economic growth in the near future.
We further investigate how forecasters revise their economic prospects when they receive new
information on scal actions. Our regression analyses demonstrate that positive innovations in
government spending tend to trigger more optimistic GDP growth forecasts when monetary policy-
makers maintain a dovish stance. When the central bank responds to ination aggressively, however,
forecasters are likely to formulate more pessimistic economic prospects. That is, scal stimulus
under such circumstances generates consumer pessimism that decreases private spending, ultimately
weakening the output e¤ects of scal policy. We corroborate our analyses by further providing
statistical test results that conrm an important role of the sentiment channel under di¤erent
regimes of policy coordination.
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Figure 1. Simulated Impulse Responses to the Government Spending Shock
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Note: We report simulated responses over 5 years to a 1% government spending shock in each regime. The
monetary authority is assumed to maintain an accommodative stance that coordinates well with expansionary
fiscal policy under the Regime D. On the other hand, the central bank maintains a hawkish policy stance
that conflicts the dovish stance of the government under the Regime H.
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Figure 2. GDP Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, gdpt, intt,mont]
′ to a 1%
government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of the total GDP
along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with
empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year
fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the
surface graph (panel (c)) at y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 3. Private GDP Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, pgdpt, intt,mont]
′ to a 1%
government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of private GDP along
with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical
distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size
rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface
graph (panel (c)) at y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 4. Consumption Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, conmt, intt,mont]
′ to a 1%
government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of consumption along
with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical
distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size
rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface
graph (panel (c)) at y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 5. Investment Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, invtt, intt,mont]
′ to a 1%
government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of investment along
with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical
distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size
rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface
graph (panel (c)) at y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 6. Real FFR Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, gdpt, rintt,mont]
′ to a 1%
government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of real interest rate
along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with
empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year
fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the
surface graph (panel (c)) at y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 7. Sentiment Responses to the Government Spending Shock
Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from xt = [gt, gdpt, rintt,mont, sentt]
′ to
a 1% government spending shock. Note that the location of sentt is irrelevant given that gt is placed first.
Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of consumer sentiment along with its 90% confidence
bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c)
reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme.
Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at
y = 0, 2, 5 (years) of the year-axis.
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Figure 8. SPF Forecast Errors for the Real GDP Growth Rate
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Note: We report the 5-quarter ahead SPF forecast errors for the real GDP growth rate. The vertical line
represents the break date estimate from SupFT test.
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Figure 9. LS Estimates for β with a Fixed Size Rolling Window Scheme
γSPFyt (5) = α+ βγ
SPF
gt (1) + εt
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Note: We report the LS estimates βˆLS for β over time with a 44-quarter fixed size rolling window so that
the initial point estimate corresponds to the pre-Volcker era (1968Q4 ∼ 1979Q3). We obtained the 90%
confidence bands (dashed lines) via the normal approximation.
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Table 1. Parameter Calibrations
Preference and HHs
β, discount factor 0.9958
h, habit formation 0.99
η, inverse Frisch labor elas. 2
n¯, steady-state labor 1/3
δ, depreciation rate 0.025
αg, subs. of private/public cons. -0.2
Frictions and Production
α, capital share 0.33
θp, elas. of subs. b/w intermediate goods 8
θw, elas. of subs. b/w different types of labor 8
ωp, Calvo price stickiness 0.8
ωw, Calvo wage stickiness 0.8
ζ2, capital utilization 0.15
κ, investment adj. cost 5
Monetary/Fiscal Calibrations
p¯i, steady-state gross inflation rate 1.0082
ψg, lagged resp. for govt spending 0.98
sg, steady-state govt spending-to-GDP ratio 0.0945
sb, steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio 1.3707
τ¯n, steady-state labor tax rate 0.2171
τ¯k, steady-state capital tax rate 0.2497
Regime D
Monetary Policy
φpi, interest rate resp. to inflation 0.83
φy, interest rate resp. to output 0.27
ψr, resp. to lagged interest rate 0.68
Fiscal Policy
γg, govt spending resp. to debt 0
Regime H
Monetary Policy
φpi, interest rate resp. to inflation 2.15
φy, interest rate resp. to output 0.93
ψr, resp. to lagged interest rate 0.79
Fiscal Policy
γg, govt spending resp. to debt 0.07
Shocks
ρg, govt spending persistence 0.8
σg, govt spending 0.01
Note: Parameters are calibrated at a quarterly frequency.
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Table 2. Structural Break Tests for β
γSPFyt (5) = α+ βγ
SPF
gt (1) + εt
Test stat.
Sample Period Break Date SupFT ExpFT AveFT
1968Q4∼2017Q4 1978Q2 19.19 6.18 7.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1978Q2∼2017Q4 N/A 5.64 1.56 2.60
(0.46) (0.29) (0.24)
Note: The regression equation is motivated to understand how
forecasters revise their economic forecasts when they update
their information on government spending. We employed a se-
quential structural break test procedure proposed by Hansen
(2001). p−values are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix: Derivations of Model Equations
This appendix lists the equilibrium conditions, steady state, and log-linearized system used for the
simulation.
A1. Equilibrium Conditions
• The first order conditions of the household
λt =
1
c∗t − hc∗a,t−1
c∗t = ct + αggt
Rt
−1 = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
)
a′ (µt) =
(
1− τk) rkt
qt = βEt
{
λt+1
λt
[(
1− τk)µt+1rkt+1 − a (µt+1) + qt+1 (1− δ)]}
1 = qt
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)
− S′
(
it
it−1
)
it
it−1
]
+ βEtqt+1
λt+1
λt
S′
(
it+1
it
)(
it+1
it
)2
Ωt = λtwtnt
(
pi∗w,t
)1−θw
+ ωwβEt
(
piιwt p¯i
1−ιw
pit+1
)1−θw (pi∗w,t+1
pi∗w,t
wt+1
wt
)θw−1
Ωt+1
Ωt = Mw%
(
pi∗w,t
)−θw(1+η)
n1+ηt + ωwβEt
(
piιwt p¯i
1−ιw
pit+1
)−θw(1+η)(pi∗w,t+1
pi∗w,t
wt+1
wt
)θw(1+η)
Ωt+1
• The wage index evolves as:
1 = ωw
(
wt−1
wt
piιwt−1p¯i
1−ιw
pit
)1−θw
+ (1− ωw)
(
pi∗w,t
)1−θw
• The first order conditions of the firm
0 = (1− θp)z2,t + θpz1,t
z1,t = λtmctyt + ωpβEt
(
pi
ιp
t p¯i
1−ιp
pit+1
)−θp
z1,t+1
z2,t = λtpi∗t yt + ωpβEt
(
pi
ιp
t p¯i
1−ιp
pit+1
)1−θp ( pi∗t
pi∗t+1
)
z2,t+1
wt
rkt
=
1− α
α
µtkt−1
nt
mct = α
−α (1− α)α−1 w1−αt
(
rkt
)α
• The price level evolves:
1 = ωp
(
pi
ιp
t−1p¯i
1−ιp
pit
)1−θp
+ (1− ωp) (pi∗t )1−θp
• Monetary authority follow its Taylor rule
Rt = (Rt−1)
ψr
[
R¯
(pit
p¯i
)φpi (yt
y¯
)φy]1−ψr
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• Government budget constraint:
Bt
Pt
+ τnwtnt + τ
krkt utkt−1 =
Rt−1Bt−1
Pt
+ gt + tr
where
gt = g
ψg
t−1
[
g¯
(
bt−1/b¯
)−γg]1−ψg
νg,t
• Markets clear:
yt =
(utkt−1)
α
(nt)
1−α
ξp,t
yt = ct + it + gt + a (ut) kt−1
where
a (ut) = ζ1 (ut − 1) + ζ2
2
(ut − 1)2
ξp,t = ωp
(
pi
ιp
t−1p¯i
1−ιp
pit
)−θp
ξp,t−1 + (1− ωp) (pi∗t )−θp
and
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 +
[
1− S
(
it
it−1
)]
it
S
(
it
it−1
)
=
κ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
• The government spending shock evolves according to
ln νg,t = ρg ln νg,t−1 + σgεg,t
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A2. Steady State
Given the steady state labor hours, the steady state inflation rate and the steady state fiscal policy
calibration, the remaining variables are defined by the system:
R =
p¯i
β
rk =
1
β − (1− δ)
1− τk
a′ (1) = rk
(
1− τk)
w = (1− α)
[
mc
( α
rk
)α] 11−α
k =
α
1− α
wn¯
rk
i = δk
y = kαn¯1−α
c = y − i− g
tr =
(
1− 1
β
)
b+ τnwn+ τkrkk − g
c∗ = c+ αgg
λ =
1
c∗ (1− h)
mc =
θp − 1
θp
% =
wλ
Mwnη
χ = % (1− τn)
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A3. Log-Linearized System
Let xˆt = ln (xt/x¯) denote the percentage deviation of a variable xt from its steady-state x¯.
• The first order conditions of the household
λˆt = − 1
1− h cˆ
∗
t +
h
1− h cˆ
∗
t−1
cˆ∗t =
c
c+ αgg
cˆt +
αgg
c+ αgg
gˆt
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
rˆkt =
ζ2
1− ζ2 uˆt
qˆt = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + β (1− δ)Etqˆt+1 + β
(
1− τk) rkEtrˆkt+1
0 = Etiˆt+1 − (1 + β) iˆt + 1
κ
qˆt + iˆt−1
Ωˆt = ωwβΩˆt+1 − ωwβ (1− θw) wˆt+1 − ωwβ (1− θw) pˆit+1 − ωwβ (1− θw) pˆi∗w,t+1
+ (1− ωwβθw) wˆt + ωwβ (1− θw) ιwpˆit + (1− θw) pˆi∗w,t − (1− ωwβ)
(
λˆt + nˆt
)
Ωˆt = ωwβΩˆt+1 + ωwβθw (1 + η) wˆt+1 + ωwβθw (1 + η) pˆit+1 + ωwβθw (1 + η) pˆi
∗
w,t+1
−ωwβθw (1 + η) wˆt − ωwβθw (1 + η) ιwpˆit − θw (1 + η) pˆi∗w,t + (1− ωwβ) (1 + η) nˆt
• The wage index evolves as:
0 = pˆi∗w,t −
ωw
1− ωw wˆt −
ωw
1− ωw pˆit +
ωw
1− ωw wˆt−1 −
ωwιw
1− ωw pˆit−1
• The first order conditions of the firm
0 = zˆ1,t − zˆ2,t
zˆ1,t = ωpβEtzˆ1,t+1 + ωpβθpEtpˆit+1 − ωpβθpιppˆit + (1− ωpβ)
(
λˆt + mˆct + yˆt
)
zˆ2,t = ωpβEt
(
zˆ2,t+1 − pˆi∗t+1
)− ωpβ (1− θp)Etpˆit+1 + pˆi∗t + ωpβ (1− θp) ιppˆit
+ (1− ωpβ)
(
λˆt + yˆt
)
wˆt = rˆ
k
t + uˆt − nˆt + kˆt−1
mˆct = (1− α) wˆt + αrˆkt
• The price level evolves:
0 = pˆi∗t −
ωp
(1− ωp) pˆit +
ωpιp
(1− ωp) pˆit−1
• Monetary authority follow its Taylor rule
rˆt = (1− ψr)φpipˆit + (1− ψr)φy yˆt + ψr rˆt−1
• Government budget constraint:
τnwn (wˆt + nˆt) + τ
krkk
(
rˆkt + uˆt
)
+ bbˆt +
b
β
pˆit − ggˆt = b
β
(
rˆt−1 + bˆt−1
)
− τkrkkkˆt−1
where
gˆt = ψg gˆt−1 − γg (1− ψg) bˆt−1 + νˆg,t
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• Markets clear:
yyˆt = ccˆt + iˆit + ggˆt +
(
1− τk) rkkuˆt
yˆt = (1− α) nˆt + αkˆt−1 + αuˆt − ξˆp,t
where
kˆt = (1− δ) kˆt−1 + δiˆt
ξˆp,t = ωpθppˆit − (1− ωp) θppˆi∗t − ωpθpιppˆit−1 + ωpξˆp,t−1
• The government spending shock evolves according to
νˆg,t = ρg νˆg,t−1 + σgεg,t
43
